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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Israel Castro Tellez appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence obtained in a search conducted after a drug dog alerted on his brother’s car. On
appeal, Tellez argues that police officers executing a search warrant seized him in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On February 7, 2017, police officers from the Caldwell City Police Department
executed a search warrant on a house in Caldwell. (Tr. Vol. I, p.21, Ls.7-19. 1) As the
officers approached the house, Israel Castro Tellez came out of the house, “walked down
the driveway, across the sidewalk, [and] got into a red car” that was parked on the street in
front of the house. (Tr. Vol. I, p.10, L.18 – p.11, L.1; p.21, L.25 – p.22, L.12.) After “[h]e
finished doing whatever he was doing in the car,” Tellez “started walking back into the
residence.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.21, L.25 – p.22, L.12.) As he was walking back into the
residence, Tellez saw the officers “and appeared to be surprised.” (Id.)
Officer Cardwell approached Tellez and spoke with him. (Tr. Vol. I, p.36, Ls.3-8.)
Tellez identified himself and told Officer Cardwell that “he was messing with a fishing
pole in his car.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.36, Ls.13-24.) Officer Cardwell detained Tellez “because
there was a search warrant on the house.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.39, Ls.3-8.) Officer Cardwell
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In addition to the preliminary hearing transcript, which the court considered as part of the
evidence at the hearing on the motion to suppress (Tr. Vol. I, p.51, Ls.3-6), there are two
other volumes of transcripts relevant to this appeal. Volume I contains the motion to
suppress hearing held on May 2, 2017; the pre-trial conference held on May 9, 2017; the
status conference held on May 23, 2017; and the sentencing hearing held on July 25, 2017.
Volume II contains the entry of plea hearing held on May 23, 2017.
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brought Tellez inside the house after it was secure “because it was cold outside.” (Tr. Vol.
I, p.40, L.23 – p.41, L.3.) Tellez was wearing a t-shirt with no jacket or coat. (See State’s
Exhibit 2 at 00:59 – 1:05.)
An officer ran a drug dog around four vehicles parked at or around the residence.
(Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.22, Ls.5-15.) The dog alerted on two of the vehicles, including the red
car that Tellez exited as the officers were approaching the house. (Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.22,
Ls.8-24.)

A search of the red car revealed “a couple of backpacks,” and inside of the

backpacks were “several packages of marijuana.” (Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.22, L.25 – p.23, L.8;
Tr. Vol. I, p.49, Ls.20-24.) The backpacks also contained “scales and packaging material.”
(Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.7, Ls.18-22.) Tellez told one of the officers that the car “belongs to
his brother and that the contents located inside the car belonged to him.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.14,
Ls.3-11.)
The state charged Tellez with possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver, possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces, and possession of drug
paraphernalia. (R., pp.8-9.) Tellez moved to suppress the drug evidence. (R., pp.21-22.)
He argued that his detention was unlawful because he “was located off of the property that
was subject to search” and that “all evidence seized as a result of this violation should be
suppressed.” (R., p.42.)
At the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, in addition to testimony from
some of the officers, the state introduced a number of police bodycam videos. (See State’s
Exhibits 1-3.) The video from the bodycam of one of the officers shows the officers
approaching the house to execute the search warrant. (See State’s Exhibit 2 at 00:50 –
00:53.) As the officers approach, Tellez can be seen in the distance standing next to an
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open door on the driver’s side of a red car that is parked in front of the house to be searched.
(See id. at 00:54 – 00:58.) He closes the door, steps over snow next to the car, and starts
walking on the dry part of the street along the snow toward the driveway of the house. (See
id. at 00:59 – 01:02.) He looks in the direction of the police, Officer Cardwell says “[h]ey,
bud,” and Tellez responds “hey” and then “whoa!” (See id. at 01:03 – 01:06; Tr. Vol. I,
p.34, L.18 – p.35, L.19.)
After hearing the evidence, the district court took the matter under advisement. (Tr.
Vol. I, p.55, Ls.15-16.)

One week later, at a pretrial conference, the district court

“announced Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and denied the motion to suppress.”
(R., pp.69-70.) The district court found that Tellez “had walked out of the residence to be
searched”; he “was just to the car retrieving something”; and “[t]here is no indication that
he ever intended to get in the vehicle and to drive away at that time.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.57,
L.12 – p.58, L.11.) The district court denied the motion to suppress because “the detention
of Mr. Tellez is unrelated to the actual search because the search resulted from the drug
dog’s alert on the vehicle while Mr. Tellez was there and no indication that he intended to
leave at that time.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.58, L.24 – p.59, L.9.)
Two weeks later, at a status conference, the district court announced additional
findings of fact and conclusions of law. (See R., pp.77-78.) The district court reaffirmed
that Tellez left the residence to be searched; “[h]e went out to a vehicle that was parked in
front of the residence”; he “got into that vehicle apparently looking for something”; and
“[h]e did not attempt to start the vehicle or to drive away.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.62, Ls.2-9.) The
district court also found that Tellez “never started the vehicle, nor did he attempt to leave
as the officers were approaching, but rather got out of the vehicle and then apparently
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noticed the officers coming, at which point he was detained.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.63, Ls.3-9.)
The district court held that the detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment because
Tellez “was in the street directly in front of the property” and he was in the “immediate
vicinity to be searched, as he had just left that residence and appeared to be heading back
to that residence.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.66, Ls.15-25.)
Tellez entered a guilty plea on the charge of possession of a controlled substance
with intent to deliver on the condition that he could appeal the district court’s ruling on the
motion to suppress. (Tr. Vol. II, p.4, L.12 – p.5, L.9; R., p.80.) The district court imposed
a sentence of three years, suspended the sentence, and placed Tellez on probation for a
period of three years. (Tr. Vol. I, p.87, Ls.4-13; R., pp.98-100.) Tellez timely appealed.
(R., pp.108-11, 118-22.)

4

ISSUE
Tellez states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Tellez’s motion to suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p.7)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Tellez failed to show that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress where officers executing a search warrant saw Tellez leave the house to be
searched, saw Tellez start walking back toward the house to be searched, and detained
Tellez directly in front of the house to be searched?

5

ARGUMENT
Tellez Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His
Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
The United States Supreme Court held in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692

(1981), that police officers executing a search warrant may, consistent with the
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment, seize individuals who are within
the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched. The officers who seized Tellez were
executing a search warrant on a house. They saw Tellez exit the house and walk out to a
car. On Tellez’s way back in to the house, the officers seized him directly in front of the
property. That seizure was within the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched,
which means the Summers rule applies and the seizure was constitutionally reasonable.
Even if the officers’ seizure of Tellez on his way back into the house had violated
the Fourth Amendment, the proper remedy would not be suppression of the drug evidence
later found in his brother’s car outside of the house. That evidence is in no way the product
of the allegedly illegal seizure. Without a factual nexus between the seizure and the search,
the exclusionary rule does not apply and the evidence cannot be suppressed.
B.

Standard Of Review
A district court’s order resolving a motion to suppress is reviewed “using a

bifurcated standard of review.” State v. Huffaker, 160 Idaho 400, 404, 374 P.3d 563, 567
(2016). “This Court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous, but may freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional principles in
light of those facts.” Id.
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C.

Tellez Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Finding His Seizure Did
Not Violate The Fourth Amendment
The district court properly concluded that the officers’ seizure of Tellez did not

violate the Fourth Amendment. 2

“The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is

reasonableness. The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and
seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.” State v. Rios, 160 Idaho 262,
265, 371 P.3d 316, 319 (2016) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)). The
officers’ seizure of Tellez was reasonable as a detention incident to the execution of a
search warrant. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 704-05 (1981).
More than three decades ago, the United States Supreme Court established what
has come to be known as the Summers rule: “a warrant to search for contraband founded
on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of
the premises while a proper search is conducted.” Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 (footnotes
omitted). The Summers rule finds “substantial justification” in three legitimate law
enforcement interests: “‘preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is
found’”; “‘minimizing the risk of harm to the officers’”; and “facilitating ‘the orderly
completion of the search,’ as detainees’ ‘self-interest may induce them to open locked
doors or locked containers to avoid the use of force.’” Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98
(2005) (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03).

2

Tellez did not argue in the district court or on appeal that Idaho’s constitution affords
greater protection than the Fourth Amendment in any way significant to this case. He has
thus failed to preserve that argument. See State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 509, 513, 236 P.3d
1269, 1273 (2010); State v. Vasquez, 129 Idaho 129, 131-32, 922 P.2d 426, 428-29 (Ct.
App. 1996).
7

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the Summers rule is “categorical.”
Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 202 (2013); see Muehler, 544 U.S. at 98. It does
not require a “case-by-case” or “ad hoc determination” as to the presence or absence of the
law enforcement interests justifying the rule. Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 n.19; see Muehler,
544 U.S. at 100 (holding Summers rule allowed detention of woman present during search
of house even absent any suspicion she was engaged in suspected criminal activity).
Instead, “[w]here Summers applies, a seizure is ipso facto ‘constitutionally reasonable.’”
Bailey, 568 U.S. at 203 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 705).
The Court has been equally clear that the Summers rule applies to the seizure of
“occupants”—that is, individuals within the “immediate vicinity of the premises to be
searched.” Bailey, 568 U.S. at 201. Whether an individual was within the “immediate
vicinity” of the premises to be searched depends on “a number of factors,” including “the
lawful limits of the premises,” whether the person is “within the line of sight” of the
premises, “the ease of reentry from the occupant’s location, and other relevant factors.” Id.
The district court’s factual findings make clear that Tellez was in the immediate
vicinity of the premises to be searched. Specifically, the district court found that the
officers “saw Mr. Tellez leave the residence to be searched”; that he started “heading back
into the residence” before the officers seized him; and that, at the time he was detained,
Tellez “was in the street directly in front of the property.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.62, Ls.2-9; p.66,
Ls.15-21.) Although Tellez was arguably not within “the lawful limits of the premises,”
he was in close proximity of the house—clearly “within the line of sight”—and could easily
reenter the house (and was attempting to do so) from where he had been seized. Bailey,
568 U.S. at 201. That is sufficient for Tellez to be considered within “the immediate
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vicinity of the premises to be searched.” -Id.; --see ---------State v. Davis, 158 Idaho 857, 861-62,
353 P.3d 1091, 1095-96 (Ct. App. 2015).
In Davis, police officers seized Davis as he was walking toward an apartment being
searched pursuant to a warrant. 158 Idaho at 859, 353 P.3d at 1093. The Idaho Court of
Appeals held that “Davis was in the immediate vicinity of the apartment being searched”
because he “was detained on a communal sidewalk that led to the common entry area of
only four apartments”; “he was walking toward the stairs—the only entrance to the secondfloor apartment”; and he was “very close to the stairs . . . perhaps 8 to 10 feet, at most, from
the bottom of the stairs.” Davis, 158 Idaho at 862, 353 P.3d at 1096. Accordingly, “the
agent was justified in stopping Davis for the limited purpose of ascertaining his identity
and relationship to the apartment.” 3 Id.
Like Davis, Tellez was within the immediate vicinity of the premises to be
searched. Davis was seized “8 to 10 feet . . . from the bottom of the stairs” that led to the
apartment, Davis, 158 Idaho at 862, 353 P.3d at 1096; Tellez was seized “directly in front
of the property” (Tr. Vol. I, p.66, Ls.15-21). Davis was “walking toward” the apartment,
Davis, 158 Idaho at 862, 353 P.3d at 1096; Tellez was “heading back to the residence” (Tr.

3

The state disagrees that a Summers seizure is in any way limited to “ascertaining [the
individual’s] identity and relationship to the [premises].” Id. That limitation contradicts
U.S. Supreme Court precedent, which allows “detention for the duration of the search.”
Muehler, 544 U.S. at 98; see Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 (holding detention permissible
“while a proper search is conducted”). Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court implicitly rejected
any such limitation in Muehler by holding that an officer’s questioning about the
immigration status of a person seized under Summers does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. Id. In any event, that issue is not before the Court here, because Tellez
expressly disavowed in the district court any theory related to the duration of the seizure.
(See Tr. Vol. I, p.52, Ls.16-24.) He has not raised that theory on appeal, nor could he have
done so. See State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, ___, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017)
(“[T]he parties will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower
court.”).
9

Vol. I, p.62, Ls.2-9). Davis was seized “on a communal sidewalk that led to the common
entry area,” Davis, 158 Idaho at 862, 353 P.3d at 1096; Tellez was seized on the street
between the red car and the driveway that led to the entryway of the house (State’s Exhibit
2 at 00:50 – 01:06.). The only relevant difference between Davis and the present case is
that the officers here saw Tellez exit the premises to be searched before seizing him on the
way back in (Tr. Vol. I, p.62, Ls.2-9), which only strengthens the conclusion that Tellez
was in the immediate vicinity of the house. Because Tellez was within “the immediate
vicinity of a premises to be searched,” the Summers rule applies and the officers’ seizure
of Tellez was thus constitutionally reasonable. Bailey, 568 U.S. at 202.
Tellez essentially asserts that he could not have been in the immediate vicinity of
the premises because he was not physically on the property. (See Appellant’s brief, p.11
(arguing Tellez was not in the immediate vicinity because he “was not inside the residence,
on the front steps of the residence, on the front lawn, or in the driveway”).) Showing that
Tellez was within the “lawful limits of the premises” would be sufficient to prove he was
in the immediate vicinity, but it is certainly not necessary. Bailey, 568 U.S. at 201.
Otherwise the U.S. Supreme Court would not have instructed courts, when making the
immediate-vicinity determination, to look at other factors in addition to the “lawful limits
of the premises,” including “whether the occupant was within the line of sight of his
dwelling, the ease of reentry from the occupant’s location, and other relevant factors.”
Bailey, 568 U.S. at 201; see Davis, 158 Idaho at 862, 353 P.3d at 1096 (holding individual
“not inside the apartment or immediately outside the door” was still “within the immediate
vicinity of the apartment”). Based on a review of all of the relevant factors, Tellez was in
the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched.
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Tellez also asserts that the seizure does not fall under Summers because the
justifications for the Summers rule are not present in this specific case and the intrusion
imposed on Tellez was substantial. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.11-16.) But the Summers
rule “is categorical; it does not depend on the ‘quantum of proof justifying detention or the
extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure.’” Muehler, 544 U.S. at 98 (quoting
Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 n.19). The Court expressly held in Summers that “[t]he rule we
adopt today does not depend upon such an ad hoc determination.” 452 U.S. at 705 n.19.
And the Court has emphasized the categorical nature of the Summers rule in every case
that it has applied the rule since that time. See, e.g., Bailey, 568 U.S. at 199 (noting the
“categorical authority to detain incident to the execution of a search warrant”).
Tellez cites Bailey and Davis as examples of cases where the court “examine[d] the
nature of the intrusion and the justifications for the detention.” (Appellant’s brief, p.11.)
Those cases, however, each raised a different question as to whether the Summers rule
should, as a general matter, be extended to cover an additional category of cases. In Bailey,
the U.S. Supreme Court had to decide whether the Summers rule should be extended to
“justify detentions beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises being searched.” 568
U.S. at 193. In Davis, the Idaho Court of Appeals had to decide whether the Summers rule
should be extended to cover cases involving apartments instead of houses. 158 Idaho at
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861; 353 P.3d at 1095.4 These courts had to balance the justifications for the Summers
rule against the relevant intrusion in the context of the new category of cases at issue and
decide whether the Summers rule was viable in this new category of cases. See Bailey,
568 U.S. at 193 (No); Davis, 158 Idaho at 861, 353 P.3d at 1095 (Yes).
There is no need to balance the justifications for the Summers rule against the level
of intrusion in this case because it does not present a question of whether the Summers rule
should be extended in any way to cover any additional category of cases. This case requires
only a straightforward application of the Summers rule—nothing more, nothing less. After
Bailey, a court deciding whether a seizure was conducted consistent with the Summers rule
need ask only one question: was the individual detained in the immediate vicinity of the
premises to be searched? See id. at 202. Where, as here, the answer is “yes,” the Summers
rule applies and the seizure is thus constitutionally reasonable. See id.
D.

Tellez Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Finding His Seizure Was
Not Related To The Search
The district court properly held that the drug evidence should not be suppressed

because “Mr. Tellez’s detention was totally unrelated to the search that actually occurred.”
(Tr. Vol. I, p.59, Ls.10-18.)

Even if a seizure violates the Fourth Amendment,

“‘[s]uppression is not justified unless the challenged evidence is in some sense the product

4

Tellez cites as another example State v. Pierce, 137 Idaho 296, 47 P.3d 1266 (Ct. App.
2002). Pierce read Summers as only applying to “a resident of the home searched” and
answered the question of whether the Summers rule should be extended to (what the Pierce
court thought was) a new category of cases: those involving “persons found on the premises
to be searched who are not readily ascertainable as residents or occupants.” 137 Idaho at
298, 47 P.3d at 1268. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Muheler and Bailey, which
both post-date Pierce, make clear that, for purposes of the Summers rule, an “occupant” is
simply someone within “the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched.” Bailey,
568 U.S. at 201; see Muheler, 544 U.S. at 98.
12

of illegal government activity.’” State v. Kapelle, 158 Idaho 121, 127, 344 P.3d 901, 907
(Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815 (1984)). This places
on the defendant an “initial burden” of making a “prima facie showing that the evidence
sought to be suppressed would not have come to light but for the government’s
unconstitutional conduct.” Kapelle, 158 Idaho at 127, 344 P.3d at 907. Tellez has failed
to satisfy this initial burden.
The district court’s factual findings and the evidence in the record make clear that
Tellez’s seizure was unrelated to the search of the red car. The district court found that
Tellez “was just to the car retrieving something” and that “[t]here is no indication that he
ever intended to get in the vehicle and to drive away.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.57, L.19 – p.58, L.11.)
Instead, the officers seized Tellez as he was “heading back to the residence.” (Tr. Vol. I,
p.62, Ls.2-9.) Given the fact that Tellez was seized heading back into the house and the
complete lack of any evidence showing Tellez planned on leaving the house in the red car,
the only conclusion supported by the evidence is that, even if Tellez had not been seized,
the red car still would have been at the house at the time of the search. (See Tr. Vol. I,
p.62, Ls.2-9; p.63, Ls.3-9.)
At some point after the officers seized Tellez, one of the officers ran a drug dog
around four different cars, including the red car. (Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.22, Ls.8-15.) The
drug dog alerted on two of those cars, including the red car. (Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.22, Ls.8-
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15; Tr. Vol. I, p.58, Ls.12-19.) The officers searched the red car and found the bags that
contained the drug evidence. 5 (Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.22, L.25 – p.23, L.8.)
That search was unrelated to Tellez’s seizure. “[T]he search resulted from the drug
dog’s alert on the vehicle.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.58, L.24 – p.59, L.9.) The officer with the drug
dog did not single out the red car because of anything Tellez did or anything he said after
being seized. (See Prelim. Hr’g Tr., p.22, Ls.8-15.) Indeed, the officer did not single out
the red car at all; he ran the drug dog around three other vehicles in the area. (Id.) Because
the search was unrelated to the challenged seizure, the drug evidence recovered in that
search should not be suppressed, regardless of the legality of the unrelated seizure. See
Kapelle, 158 Idaho at 127, 344 P.3d at 907.
Tellez contends that the district court “implicitly reconsidered” its decision that the
seizure and search were unrelated, which was made on May 9, 2017, when it decided, on
May 23, 2017, that the seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. (See Appellant’s
brief, pp.17-18.) The better reading of the record is that the district court denied the motion
to suppress using two different, consistent theories: (1) the seizure did not violate the
Fourth Amendment (May 23, 2017) and (2) the exclusionary rule does not apply because
the search and the seizure were unrelated (May 9, 2017).

5

Tellez did not challenge the search of the vehicle on grounds other than his seizure in the
district court or on appeal, and with good reason. The officer’s use of a drug dog outside
of the vehicle was not a search under the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Yeoumans, 144
Idaho 871, 873, 172 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405, 408 (2005)). Once the drug dog alerted, the officer had probable cause to search the
vehicle. Id. That includes a search of “every part of the vehicle,” including “all containers
within [the] vehicle, without qualification as to ownership or the nature of the container.”
State v. Easterday, 159 Idaho 173, 175, 357 P.3d 1281, 1283 (Ct. App. 2015).
14

No one moved the district court to reconsider its May 9 decision, and the district
court never gave any indication that it was doing so on May 23. Nor can it be inferred
from the May 23 decision that the district court was reconsidering its findings made on
May 9; the May 23 decision is entirely consistent with the May 9 decision. Furthermore,
the court minutes for both days state that the district court “announced Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and denied the motion to suppress.” (R., pp.69-70, 77-78
(emphasis omitted).) All of those findings of fact and conclusions of law, including those
made on May 9, 2017, are properly before this Court on appeal.
Tellez also “asserts that there was insufficient evidence for the district court to
determine that an exception to the exclusionary rule” applied. (Appellant’s brief, pp.1819). That is not what the district court determined; the district court found that the search
and seizure were “totally unrelated”—meaning that the exclusionary rule did not apply at
all. (Tr. Vol. I, p.59, Ls.10-18.) “Application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence
is appropriate only as to evidence that is fruit of the illegal government activity.” State v.
Babb, 136 Idaho 95, 98, 29 P.3d 406, 409 (Ct. App. 2001). To prevent suppression, the
state need only prove that an exception to the exclusionary rule purged the taint of illegal
government activity if the defendant first carries his “initial burden” by providing
“evidence to show a factual nexus between the illegality and the State’s acquisition of the
evidence.” State v. McBaine, 144 Idaho 130, 133, 157 P.3d 1101, 1104 (Ct. App. 2007).
Here, Tellez failed to carry his initial burden, so “there was no ‘taint’ to purge.” McBaine,
144 Idaho at 135, 157 P.3d at 1106.
All that Tellez offers on appeal to show a factual nexus between the seizure and the
search is the statement that, “if Mr. Tellez was not unlawfully detained, he would have
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departed from the residence in his car.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.18-19.) That bare assertion
finds no support in the record. The drug evidence was not found in his car; it was found in
the red car, which belonged to Tellez’s brother. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.14, Ls.3-11.) Although
Tellez clearly had access to the red car (see Tr.. Vol. I, p.31, Ls.7-11), nothing in the record
shows he had the keys or means to drive the red car away from the house.
Moreover, as the district court found, there was “no indication that he intended to
leave at that time.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.58, L.24 – p.59, L.9.) The officers seized him when “he
was heading back into the residence.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.62, Ls.2-9; see Tr. Vol. I, p.21, L.25 –
p.22, L.12.) He did not tell the officers that he was trying to leave in the car but that he
“had gone out to the vehicle to look at or obtain some fishing gear.” (Tr., Vol. I., p.62,
L.20 – p.63, L.2; see Tr. Vol. I, p.36, Ls.13-24.) And, as one of the bodycam videos makes
clear, Tellez was not exactly dressed to be leaving on a February evening in Caldwell: he
was wearing a t-shirt, (State’s Exhibit 2 at 00:50 – 01:06), even though “[i]t was snowy”
(Tr. Vol. I, p.61, L.20 – p.62, L.1), and “cold outside” (Tr. Vol. I, p.40, L.23 – p.41, L.3).
Despite Tellez’s bare assertion on appeal that he would have left in his car if he had
not been seized, he has not pointed to any evidence that shows he could have—and the
record indicates he would not have—left in the red car that contained the drug evidence. It
follows that, even if Tellez had not been seized, the red car still would have been parked at
the house when the officer used the drug dog, and the officer still would have found the
drug evidence. This makes the allegedly unlawful seizure “totally unrelated to the search”
that produced the drug evidence, (Tr. Vol. I, p.59, Ls.10-18), and thus the exclusionary rule
does not apply. See Kapelle, 158 Idaho at 127, 344 P.3d at 907.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered upon
Tellez’s conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver.
DATED this 21st day of February, 2018.

/s/ Jeff Nye______________________
JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General
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